Economic System and Welfare Regime Dynamics in Japan since the Early 2000s-The Case of Occupational Pensions by Conrad, H.
	



	
	


	

 


	

	
				


 
!∀#∃%&∃∋(

)∗+	),)−+).	
(+∃%%%/ 
	
0
.

∗
0
+!1&&&/&1%
2∗∗3%%14/∃41
		5

,&%&%&4∗%%14∃41&&%%%







	6	

				

 1 
Economic System and Welfare Regime Dynamics in 
Japan Since the Early 2000s ± The Case of 
Occupational Pensions 
 
 
By 
Harald Conrad 
 
School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield 
h.conrad@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
 
The final definitive version of this article has been published as: 
Economic System and Welfare Regime Dynamics in Japan Since the Early 2000s ± 
The Case of Occupational Pensions. In: Journal of Social Policy 41 (1), 119±140. 
 
 
 
Suggested Citation 
Harald Conrad (2012) Economic System and Welfare Regime Dynamics in Japan 
Since the Early 2000s ± The Case of Occupational Pensions, Journal of Social Policy 
41 (1): 119±140. 
 
 
 
 
This article is the final version prior to publisher proofing. Readers are advised 
to refer to the published article for accurate citation and referencing. If you are 
unable to access the published version, then please contact the author at: 
h.conrad@sheffield.ac.uk. 
 2 
Economic System and Welfare Regime Dynamics in 
Japan Since the Early 2000s ± The Case of 
Occupational Pensions 
 
Harald Conrad 
 
School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, 6/8 Shearwood Road, Sheffield 
S10 2TD 
email: h.conrad@sheffield.ac.uk  
 
Abstract 
This article discusses significant changes of Japanese occupational pensions since the 
early 2000s. Our analysis shows that these schemes have been key components of 
policies to promote private welfare provision and have been highly compatible with 
human capital investment strategies that are based on long-term employment 
relationships of regular workers. However, since the 1990s, occupational pensions 
have come under increased pressure due to underfunding problems caused by 
depressed stock markets and changes in accounting standards that made these 
underfunding problems apparent. In response to these challenges Japanese companies 
have restructured their occupational pension arrangements. The nature of these efforts 
can be explained with reference to existing institutional complementarities with the 
economic system on the one hand and changes in the cost-benefit calculations of 
employers, employees and the civil service on the other hand. Whereas 
complementarities, especially with human resource management factors, have 
ultimately defined the limits of these changes, an actor-centered analysis helps to 
explain the particular nature of changes within these boundaries.  
 
Introduction 
In the last two decades, two strands of social science research have significantly 
advanced our understanding of the institutional configurations of advanced industrial 
societies. The first strand of literature, profoundly influenced by Esping-$QGHUVHQ¶V
seminal The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), has stressed cross-national 
differences among welfare-states and identified distinct types of welfare regimes 
across the world. The second (e.g. Deeg and Jackson, 2007; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Whitely, 1999; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997) has stressed the embeddedness of 
national business practices in their cultural and institutional context, with the 
Varieties-of-Capitalism (VOC) literature elucidating the institutional foundations of 
GLYHUVH QDWLRQDO µYDULHWLHV¶ RI economic systems or, more narrowly, production 
regimes. Subsequent research (e.g. Schröder, 2009; Iverson, 2005; Ebbinghaus and 
Manow, 2001) has started to bridge these two strands of literature by investigating the 
links between particular forms of social protection and economic systems or national 
systems of production. The latter literature has focused primarily on the static aspects 
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and positive relationships between those domains, while institutional changes have 
received comparatively little attention (Deeg and Jackson, 2007; Rhodes, 2005). By 
focusing explicitly on such changes, this article hopes to contribute to our 
understanding of the dynamics that shape relationships between national forms of 
social protection and their economic systems.  
Existing research has shed some light on the distinct links and complementarities 
betZHHQ-DSDQ¶Veconomic system µ7KH-DSDQHVH0RGHO¶DQGIHDWXUHVRILWVV\VWHP
of social protection (e.g. Estévez-Abe, 2008; Miyamoto, 2008; Takegawa, 2007), but 
there is as yet limited understanding of the changes that have modified these links 
since the burst of the so-called bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s. While 
this article focuses on the case RI-DSDQ¶V occupational pensions to investigate such 
changing dynamics, our theoretical framework and findings will hopefully contribute 
more widely to a general understanding of factors that shape changes in the welfare 
regime-economic systemnexus. 
A key assumption of this article is that institutional complementarities between social 
protection and economic systems influence the nature of any adjustments to these 
arrangements. Our key argument is that such complementarities define ultimately the 
limits of such changes, while an analysis of social actors¶ cost-benefit calculus helps 
us to explain the particular nature of the changes within these boundaries. 
The article proceeds as follows. Following some methodological remarks, we discuss 
the existing literature on links between social protection and economic systems, 
IRFXVLQJ SULPDULO\ RQ WKH UROH RI -DSDQ¶V RFFXSDWLRQDO SHQVLRQV $Jainst this 
backdrop, we subsequently develop a theoretical framework for the study of the 
dynamics of such links. Applying this framework to recent changes in Japanese 
occupational pensions, the penultimate section presents the findings of an interview-
based research project. The final section consists of an overall conclusion. 
 
Methodological Remarks 
In addition to Japanese secondary statistical, ministerial and academic sources, this 
article is primarily based on an analysis of semi-structured interviews with human 
resource managers of medium- and large-sized Japanese companies, labor union 
officials, experts in governmental and semi-governmental institutions, actuaries, as 
well as pension and human resource management experts from research and academic 
institutions. To avoid a sector bias, specialists were chosen from both manufacturing 
(automobile, electronics) and servicing industries (transport, utilities). Whenever 
possible, statements and assessments where crosschecked against those of other 
informants and secondary sources. The one to two hour-long interviews were, with 
one exception, conducted in Japanese with 22 informants at fifteen locations in April 
2009. Two of the informants are members of the official eight-PHPEHUµ2FFXSDWLRQDO
3HQVLRQ 5HVHDUFK *URXS¶ .LJ\ǀ 1HQNLQ .HQN\ǌNDL HVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH GLUHFWRU-
general of the Pension Bureau of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare to discuss 
and advise the government on issues of occupational pension reform (see the 
appendix for the anonymous list of informants).  
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Literature Review 
Existing research on capitalist diversity has aimed to establish typologies of 
production and welfare regimes. While the Varieties-of-Capitalism literature has 
grouped countries according to the way firms respond to different institutional 
environments of production systems (e.g. Deeg and Jackson, 2007; Hall and Soskice, 
2001), Esping-$QGHUVHQ¶V, 1999) welfare regime analysis has focused on how 
welfare benefits are distributed across countries based on the rights and duties of 
individuals. Both of these typologies arrive at very similar country groupings with 
most liberal market economies (LME) EHLQJDFFRPSDQLHGE\µOLEHUDO¶ZHOIDUHVWDWHV
and coordinated market economies (CME) being accompanied by either social 
democratic or conservative welfare arrangements (Schröder, 2009).  
Scholars like Iversen (2005), Iversen and Soskice (2001) and Huber and Stephens 
(2001) have argued that a large welfare state constitutes an important, if not 
definitional, component of CMEs. The underlying argument is that firms and workers 
in CMEs engage in human capital investment strategies that are based on long-term 
employment relationships. For employees to be willing to invest in firm-specific skill 
development, job security is a critical factor. Voters in CMEs are therefore likely to 
demand insurance against income loss via strong redistributive and social insurance 
polices to balance the risks of unemployment in CMEs ZKHUHZRUNHUV¶ILUP-specific 
skills contribute to inflexible external labour markets and lower chances of re-
employment.  
With regard to this argument, the Japanese case presents something of a puzzle. While 
the country is widely considered to be an important example of a CME ± with long-
term mutually cooperative relationships between firms and labour, between firms and 
banks, and between different firms (e.g. Dore, 2000; Aoki, 1988) ± its comparatively 
lean welfare state with little extension of social rights independent of market 
mechaniVPV µGH-FRPPRGLILFDWLRQ¶ SURPSWHG (VSLQJ-Andersen (1997) to classify 
the country as a hybrid combination of liberal and conservative-corporatist welfare 
regime elements. That is, low public expenditure levels and comparatively heavy 
reliance on private welfare suggested to him a closer relationship to the liberal model, 
whereas employment and status-segmented social insurance schemes, scarcity of 
public social services due to the dominance of familialism in society, and unequal 
levels of benefits were seen as characteristic of the corporatist model.  
 Explicitly addressing this puzzle, several scholars (e.g. Estévez-Abe, 2008; 
Miyamoto, 2008; Takegawa, 2007; Estévez-Abe et al., 2001) have argued that we 
need to go beyond a traditional welfare state analysis to understand how -DSDQ¶V
work-based and savings-oriented social security programs and their functional 
equivalents have sustained WKHFRXQWU\¶s CME in place of its small welfare state. Key 
EXLOGLQJEORFNVRI WKHVH µDOWHUQDWLYH¶DUUDQJHPHQWs are policies that promote private 
welfare provision along sectoral lines, policies that protect jobs and income by 
regulating market competition and policies through which the state creates jobs and 
training opportunities, especially public works projects.  
Japanese occupational pensions are a key component of policies to promote such 
private welfare provision and have been shown to be highly compatible with common 
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Japanese human capital investment strategies that are based on long-term employment 
relationships for regular employees. The essence of the compatibility argument is that 
the so-FDOOHG µWKUHH SLOODUV RI WKH -DSDQHVH HPSOR\PHQW V\VWHP¶ QDPHO\ VHQLRULW\-
oriented pay, long-term employment practices and enterprise-based unions (e.g. 
Debroux, 2003), have supported dominant work practices such as frequent job 
rotations, broad job descriptions, teamwork and on-the-job training that are crucial for 
the development of firm-specific skills. As an integral part of the seniority-oriented 
pay systems, occupational pensions have complemented these employment practices 
by providing incentives for cooperative industrial relations and long-term oriented 
employment and by giving companies access to stable funds for internal long-term 
investment strategies (Estévez-Abe, 2008). Reflecting the typically fragmented nature 
of welfare schemes in Japan (Miyamoto, 2008), it is important to note, however, that 
only regular workers are commonly eligible for occupational pension benefits.  
In order to illuminate the above-mentioned interdependencies in closer detail, we need 
to consider the reasons and influencing factors that prompt companies to provide 
occupational pension benefits and how they apply to the Japanese case.  
A major motive of firms to pay occupational pensions is to influence the recruitment, 
retention as well as retirement of workers. According to Logue and Rader (1998) 
there is no definitive theory or robust empirical research that would indicate why 
certain types of pension plans are favoured over others, but a common assumption is 
that the choice is influenced by considerations of employer-specific human capital. 
Firms that rely heavily on company-specific knowledge are likely to adopt defined 
benefit (DB) plans with back-loaded final-pay formulas (benefits based on average 
HDUQLQJVGXULQJDVSHFLILHGQXPEHURI\HDUVDWWKHHQGRIDZRUNHU¶VFDUHHUZLWKWKH
EHQHILWHTXDOOLQJDSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHZRUNHU¶VILQDODYHUDJHHDUQLQJVPXOWLSOLHGE\WKH
number of service years) where workers have an incentive to sustain their efforts over 
their entire career so that they can achieve high career-end salaries. The major 
DGYDQWDJHRI'%SODQVIURPDQHPSOR\HH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHLV WKDW WKH\SURYLGHDVWDEOH
replacement rate of final income. As real wages change, employers have to adjust 
their funding rates and thus bear the investment risks in these plans. 
In contrast, companies that rely more heavily on workers with specialist knowledge 
from the external labor market are more likely to prefer defined contribution (DC) 
plans that are not as heavily back-loaded and more easily portable if an employee 
changes jobs (Bodie et al., 1988). In a DC plan, employers make provision for 
periodic contribution payments into an account that is established for each 
participating employee. Depending on underlying regulations, contributions can be 
made either by the employer, the employee, or by both parties. The final benefits are a 
reflection of the total of all contributions and any investment gains or losses. Benefits 
are thus not specified in advance and the employer does not shoulder any investment 
risk. 
 A third plan type are cash balance (CB) plans, which combine features of 
traditional DB and DC plans. In a CB plan the employer credits a SDUWLFLSDQW¶s 
account with an employer contribution plus interest credit. Such individual accounts 
make the plan look like a DC plan, but the funding limits, funding requirements and 
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investment risk are based on DB requirements. Changes in the portfolio do not affect 
the final benefits of the participants upon retirement or termination. In other words, 
just like in a DB plan, the company solely bears all ownership of profits and losses in 
the portfolio. Employer contributions can be credited in several ways, for example as 
a fixed amount, a fixed percentage of earnings or through point systems that link 
factors like µjob grade¶, µabilities¶, µnumber of years of employment¶ or µperformance¶ 
to specific pay credits. MHPEHUV¶DFFRXQWVJURZ by these annual pay credits and an 
interest credit at either a fixed-rate or a variable-rate linked to an index such as the 
government bond rate. If the plan adopts a variable interest UDWHWKHHPSOR\HU¶VULVNis 
more limited. A key difference between DB, DC and CB plans is the benefit accrual. 
DB plans provide for larger beneILW DFFUXDOV ODWHU LQ DQ HPSOR\HH¶V FDUHHU, while 
benefits in DC and CB plans accrue earlier (see Rappaport et al., 1997 for more 
details on CB plans).  
 The adoption of a particular type of occupational pension plan is thus a 
strategic choice for a certain type of incentive structure. Furthermore, this choice is 
likely to be influenced by government regulation which can make such schemes 
attractive to both sponsors and employees by providing a favourable tax treatment 
resulting in deferred or even permanently reduced taxes (Logue and Rader, 1998).  
Before the occupational pension reforms of the early 2000s, which will be discussed 
in the findings section, Japanese employers used basically three types of DB-type 
retirement provisions: lump-sum retirement payments via Book-Reserve Plans 
(BRPs), pension payments via Tax-Qualified Pension Plans (TQPPs) and Employee 
Pension Funds (EPFs). The beneficiaries of these plans were workers who were 
covered by implicit long-term employment promises and seniority-oriented wage 
structures. Similar to the prevailing seniority-oriented wage structures, these DB-type 
plans rewarded loyalty to the company with disproportionally increasing benefits after 
long years of tenure, while voluntary quitting was heavily penalized by sharply 
reduced benefits (Maruyama, 1995). These arrangements were supported by 
government regulation which restricted tax benefits solely to pension plans that were 
designed as DB schemes, while DC plans did not receive any preferential tax 
treatment and attracted consequently only a small number of participants (Estévez-
Abe, 2008; Watanabe, 1998).  
Government regulation played an important role in shaping the institutional 
foundations of the EPFs which were first introduced in 1966. In the late 1950s, 
employers lobbied for changes in the tax code to spread the annual expenses for 
retirement benefits by replacing lump-sum payments through BRPs with new 
occupational pensions in form of EPFs. However, this idea was first rejected by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare because the bureaucrats feared that such an 
improvement of occupational pensions would negatively impact their plans for 
increases in the benefit levels of the main public pension insurance, the EmpOR\HHV¶
Pension Insurance (EPI). It was feared that improved occupational pensions would 
result in less political backing for higher public pension benefits in the EPI as they 
were advocated by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Eventually, in a political 
compromise firms were allowed to contract out of the earnings-related component of 
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the public EPI in return for a general increase in EPI benefits (Shinkawa, 2005). This 
means in practice that a firm with an EPF pays a reduced social security contribution 
to the public pension system in exchange for providing a pension benefit that 
substitutes the earnings-related part of the public EPI. In addition to this substitutable 
component (GDLNǀ EXEXQ), the EPF is required to pay a supplementary component 
(fuka bubun), which up to the year 2001 had to be at least 30 per cent of the 
substitutable benefits accrued while working for a firm. The nature of these 
DUUDQJHPHQWV LOOXVWUDWHV KRZ WKH -DSDQHVH VWDWH µRXWVRXUFHG¶ SXEOLF SHQVLRQ
obligations to the private sector (Miyamoto, 2008). 
A third important IDFWRU LQIOXHQFLQJHPSOR\HUV¶ LQWHUHVW LQSHQVLRQVFKHPHV LV WKHLU
potential as a measure to preserve industrial peace vis-à-vis the trade unions (Esping-
Andersen, 1996; Bridgen and Meyer, 2005). During intensive labor conflicts 
following World War II, Japanese employers struggled to reestablish their control 
over the workforce until the early 1950s. During this period, employers used generous 
BRPs as an incentive for unions to sign revised labor agreements that aimed at 
curtailing radical labor movements by limiting union membership to employees of the 
firm (Estévez-Abe, 2008). Through the dissemination of BRPs, employees were 
µIRUFHG¶WRLQYHVWWKHLUUHWLUHPHQWLQFRPHLQWKHLUHPSOR\HUV and were thus made into 
µVWDNHKROGHUV¶ LQ WKHLU FRPSDQLHV¶ IRUWXQHV %\ WKH PLG-1960s a new kind of 
cooperative industrial relations had emerged which emphasized a company-level 
long-term alliance between workers and management. Beginning in the late 1960s, 
companies replaced BRPs, which remained attractive as a source for internal capital 
for reinvestments, partially by TQPPs or EPFs, which were comparatively more 
attractive in terms of their tax treatment. However, just like BRPs, these schemes 
offered limited portability of pension rights and continued to strengthen thereby the 
long-term employment relationships.  
 The above discussion has highlighted some of the stable and complementary 
aspects of -DSDQ¶Vemployment practices and occupational pension arrangements. In 
addition to these links, it can be argued that BRPs and DB plans had wider 
UDPLILFDWLRQV IRU -DSDQ¶V ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP DQG FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH SUDFWLFHV, 
reinforcing feedback effects. The internal reserves of BRPs can be used to reduce a 
ILUP¶V external liabilities or to finance new investments, thereby contributing to its 
financial autonomy by cutting dependence on external finance via equity markets. DB 
plans tend to invest in more conservative investments with a guaranteed minimum 
return, whereas DC plans are expected to have a stronger demand for high-return 
equities. The latter are therefore likely to press more for shareholder-value-oriented 
corporate governance. Japanese BRPs and DB plans, whose assets have been 
administered by life insurance companies and trust banks, have thus been closely 
OLQNHG WR WKH FRXQWU\¶V bank-based financial system that has been characterized by 
stable shareholdings and stakeholder-centered, rather than shareholder-centered, 
corporate governance practices (Jackson and Vitols, 2001).  
 While this literature review has highlighted some of the most striking 
FRPSOHPHQWDULWLHV EHWZHHQ -DSDQ¶V RFFXSDWLRQDO SHQVLRQ DUUDQJHPHQWV and its 
employment practices, financial system and corporate governance patterns, it is 
 8 
important to stress that these relationships are by no means as stable as the VOC 
literature might suggest (Deeg and Jackson, 2007). In fact, Japanese companies are, 
just like those in other industrialized countries, confronted with growing cost 
pressures and changing regulatory environments which have induced various 
corporate reforms. For example, recent research has established that Japanese firm- 
bank relationships, corporate finance and governance patterns as well as inter-firm 
relationships have undergone substantial transformations since the 1990s (e.g. Aoki, 
Jackson and Miyajima, 2007). 
A depressed stock market and declining interest rates following the burst of the 
bubble economy in the early 1990s contributed to a rapid increase in underfunding of 
the prevailing Japanese DB plans. Data from the Pension Fund Association show that 
in the period 1989-2003, the average return on assets managed by EPFs was just 2 per 
cent in nominal terms, while the government set guaranteed rate was 5.5 per cent 
.LJ\ǀ 1HQNLQ 5HQJǀNDL, 2003). Furthermore, new accounting standards that were 
introduced in April 2000 made these unfunded pension liabilities for the first time 
YLVLEOH RQ FRPSDQLHV¶ EDODQFH VKHHWV DQG GDPDJHG WKHLU VWRFN PDUNHW YDOXDWLRQV
.LJ\ǀ1HQNLQ .HQN\ǌNDL, 6KLQLDSXUDQ.DLKDWVX.LNǀ, 2004).  
Against the backdrop of these cost pressures, it is natural to assume that Japanese 
companies would seek to restructure their occupational pension arrangements. The 
key question is how we can explain the nature of any such changes with reference to 
the pertaining complementarities between occupational pension arrangements and 
other business practices. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Ebbinghaus and Manow (2001) argue that existing institutional complementarities 
provide institutional advantages under international competition. Employers are 
therefore likely to opt for adaptations in industrial relations and social protection that 
maintain these beneficial production regimes. Vogel (2006), building on insights from 
New Institutional Economics, the VOC literature, and economic sociology, outlines a 
theoretical framework according to which actors consider changes based on a cost-
benefit calculus on three levels of rationality. The first level is an analysis of the 
immediate costs and benefits of an action. On a second level, actors consider the 
wider cost and benefit ramifications, such as implications for other practices. This is 
essentially the perspective of the VOC literature. On a third level, which adds a 
sociological perspective, actors will consider social and reputational costs and 
benefits. These three circles of rationality overlap in practice and it is difficult to 
prove one logic of rationality to be more important than another, but this model can be 
useful to specify how different actors and their cost-benefit calculus might shape 
outcomes. Applying this theoretical framework to an analysis of changes in Japanese 
occupational pensions, we will discuss in the findings section the specific cost-benefit 
calculus RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VHPSOR\HUVHPSOR\HHVDQGWKHFLYLOVHUYLFH 
While a cost-EHQHILW FDOFXOXV LQIOXHQFHV DFWRUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI ZKDW DSSHDU WR EH
possible or desirable changes under any given circumstances, there is also the 
question how such outcomes can be achieved in the reform process. In particular for 
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WKH HPSOR\HUV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH LW LV KHOSIXO WR UHIHU KHUH WR 3LHUVRQ¶V  VHPLQDO
paper The New Politics of the Welfare State, in which he develops hypotheses about 
the preconditions under which politicians may be able to advocate retrenchments of 
ZHOIDUH SURJUDPPHV :KLOH 3LHUVRQ¶V DQDO\VLV IRFXVHV RQ SROLWLFLDQV DQG SXEOLF
benefits, some of his insights apply equally to actors and benefit programmes in the 
private sector. Pierson argues that budgetary crisies can open up opportunities for 
reform, because DGYRFDWHV RI UHWUHQFKPHQW FDQ µexploit such moments to present 
reforms as an effort to save the welfaUH VWDWH UDWKHU WKDQGHVWUR\ LW¶ (Pierson, 1996: 
177). In the analysis below we will investigate to what extent Japanese employers 
have used such negotiation strategies while restructuring their benefit programs. 
 
Findings 
 
General trends in occupational pension provision since the early 2000s 
As mentioned above, underfunding problems caused by depressed stock markets in 
the latter half of the 1990s and changes in accounting standards in the year 2000 put 
increased cost pressures on Japanese occupational pension plans. In response to these 
problems, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and the Japan 
)HGHUDWLRQ RI (PSOR\HUV¶ $VVRFLDWLRQV 1LNNHLUHQ lobbied for new tax-exempt 
benefit options such as DC plans and options to leave the semi-public EPFs (e.g. 
Keidanren, 1996). Such new options were at first not welcomed by the overseeing 
bureaucrats of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, since they were expected to 
weaken the dominant position of the semi-public EPFs, but private sector pressure led 
eventually to substantial regulatory reforms in the years 2001/2002 .LJ\ǀ 1HQNLQ
.HQN\ǌNDL, 2007; informants #1, #6, #16). The new legislation was enacted in two 
separate laws. The first law changed the rules governing DB plans, including an 
option for EPFs to return their assets related to the contracted-out portion of the public 
EPI back to the government, the introduction of hybrid CB plans and other type of 
new DB plans, as well as the scheduled elimination of TQPPs until 2012. The second 
law introduced DC plans with a modest level of employer contributions under tax-
exempt status.  
 The new legislation presented various new options for pension program 
restructuring and many large companies engaged subsequently in such activities. 
Before discussing the factors that shaped these changes, let us first take a brief look at 
overall developments. Although the percentage of companies paying retirement 
benefits decreased slightly after 2001/2002, 84 per cent of companies with more than 
30 employees continue to pay such EHQHILWV.ǀVHLUǀGǀVKǀ, 2008), which make up 6.8 
per cent of total labour costs in manufacturing (JILPT, 2008).  
The number of active pension plan participants declined from 20.1 million in 2001 to 
17 million in 2007, while DB and DB-type benefits remain, in relative terms, the 
dominant form of retirement benefit (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 here 
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While the number of EPFs and TQPPS has declined substantially since the early 
2000s, these plans were to a large extent compensated for by newly introduced DB 
and DC plans (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 here 
 
While there were 1,737 EPFs with 10.87 million participants in 2001, only 620 plans 
with 4.8 million members remained in 2008. About 50 per cent of former EPFs were 
converted into new DB plans, during which process the companies returned their 
obligations for the contracted-out portioQRIWKHSXEOLF(PSOR\HHV¶3HQVLRQ,QVXUDQFH
back to the government .ǀVHLUǀGǀVKǀ1HQNLQN\RNX, 2009). This has had the effect 
of removing large pension liabilities from corporate balance sheets (Sato, 2005) and 
has fundamentally altered the state-enterprise welfare mix since almost all large 
companies have now left the semi-public EPFs, with only smaller companies 
remaining. 
Given the scheduled elimination of TQPPs by 2012, it is not surprising that these 
plans, which are most dominant among smaller firms, have also experienced a 
significant decline since the 2001/2002 reforms. Both in terms of the number of plans 
and participants, TQPPs have declined by one-half. However, just like in the case of 
the EPFs, many of these schemes were transferred into the newly available types of 
DB or DC plans. 
The most significant development with regards to medium- and large-sized companies 
is that they have largely left the semi-public EPFs and have replaced those plans with 
multi-layered retirement benefit systems that offer a combination of DB and DC 
benefits. In contrast, over 50 per cent of companies with less than 300 employees 
offer now only DC plans (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 here 
 
$FWRUV¶Fost-benefit calculus and pension restructuring 
 
Employers 
All of the informants agreed that cost considerations were the most important factor 
driving HPSOR\HUV¶pension restructuring efforts. However, while employers in liberal 
market economies like the United States or the United Kingdom have drastically 
reduced DB plans in the last two decades WR PLQLPL]H FRPSDQLHV¶ costs and risk 
exposure (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008; Office for National Statistics, 2008), this 
has clearly not been the case in Japan. Here, medium- and large-sized employers have 
instead often created new multi-layered retirement benefit systems in which DB 
benefits continue to play a dominant role. 47 per cent of large companies have 
adopted DC plans in addition to the existing DB plans, thus only partially replacing 
DB benefits with DC schemes. The percentage of DC benefits within the new 
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retirement benefit packages varies, but does usually not exceed 10 - 25 per cent 
(informants #12, #13, #14, #19). A good example of such restructuring efforts is the 
electronics giant Panasonic (formerly Matsushita). In 2002, immediately after this 
option became available, Panasonic left the semi-public EPF. Up until then retirement 
benefits (consisting of a lump-sum and an EPF pension) were primarily a reflection of 
age and length of service as part of a final salary system. Beginning in 2002, 
Panasonic started to operate a multi-layered retirement benefit system (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 here 
 
For the first tier it adopted a point system, which reflects both individual performance 
HYDOXDWLRQVDQGWKHSRVLWLRQRIHPSOR\HHVLQDJULGV\VWHPRIµZRUNJURXSV¶OLQNLQJ
this point system to benefits paid through a DB plan. As a second tier it introduced a 
&%SODQZKRVHEHQHILWVZHUHOLQNHGWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIHPSOR\HHV¶EDVHSD\$VD
third tier, it maintained a lump-sum benefit for employees retiring between 50-60 
years of age. Other large companies, adopting similar complex pension systems 
include, for example, Tokyo Electric Power Corporation and Daihatsu Motor 
Corporation (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2008a). 
What explains the resilience of DB plans in Japan? If we refer to the theoretical 
framework in the previous section, it is evident that immediate costs and benefits are 
only one factor influencing Japanese actors. To understand the recent changes, the 
importance of the historical legacy of Japanese occupational pensions can hardly be 
overestimated. All of the informants agreed that current developments could only be 
understood with explicit reference to the system of lump-sum retirement payments 
(BRPs) and underlying entrenched views that retirement benefits, regardless of their 
financing mode as BRPs, TQPPS or EPFs, have so far been considered a form of 
deferred wage. This social consensus has functioned as a departure point for 
management and labour and is one important explanatory factor for the resilience of 
DB benefits.  
While Japanese employers have undoubtedly sought to reduce their cost and risk 
exposure since the early 2000s, they have been careful not to alienate long-term 
employees by toppling existing incentive structures (informants #2, #3, #4, #1, #14, 
#15, #16, #18, #19, #20, #21, #22). Such social constraints, whether real or perceived, 
have shaped the institutional innovation of the newly evolving multi-layered 
retirement systems. As part of a careful reform approach, Japanese employers have 
reduced their direct costs and risks by partially replacing DB with DC benefits and by 
tying the existing DB benefits closer to HPSOR\HHV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH IDFWRUV The latter 
change reflects a general trend in Japanese wage systems in recent years, where 
seniority factors have also been partially replaced by performance factors (Conrad, 
2010). The overall moderate nature of these reforms is confirmed by the fact that 
companies have rarely reduced the overall contribution levels after reforming their 
benefit structures 6KLQLDSXUDQ.DLKDWVX.LNǀ, 2004).  
While companies have thus maintained fairly comprehensive pension benefit 
packages for their regular workers, they have at the same time realized cost reductions 
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by drastically increasing the proportion of non-regular workers that are not covered 
under any of these schemes (informants #2, #3, #4, #1, #14, #15, #16, #18, #19, #20, 
#21, #22). The percentage of such non-regular workers in the Japanese labour force 
has increased substantially from 20.1 per cent in 1994 to 33.2 per cent in 2006 (JILPT 
2009).  
While Japanese employers have not made any substantial direct benefit cuts for their 
core labour force, they have frequently communicated the partial shift to DC plans to 
those employees as an unavoidable strategy to preserve the very existence of 
occupational pension benefits (informants #1, #7, #8, #13). This is the same 
implementation strategy that Pierson (1996) has identified for the retrenchment of 
public welfare programs. 
While all informants acknowledged that shareholder value factors have recently 
gained in importance in the corporate governance of Japanese companies, none of the 
informants believed that this had any significant influence on occupational pension 
arrangements. None of the informants believed that the increase of DC plans could be 
explained by heightened (foreign) shareholder pressure. This finding is in line with 
the results of a recent study by Jackson (2007: 294) who ILQGV WKDW µFRUSRUDWH
governance factors had no significant influence on adopting merit pay elements based 
on individual performance, firm performance, business unit performance, or 
FRPSHWLWRUV¶ ZDJHV¶. However, some informants stressed another important issue 
related to corporate governance. According to this view, traditional BRPs continue to 
be an interesting option for internal finance, because they make companies less 
dependent on equity markets and immunize them from stock market movements that 
can negatively affect companies¶ balance sheets (informants #17, #20, #21, #22). 
In sum, iW DSSHDUV WKDW IURP WKH HPSOR\HUV¶ SHUVSHFWive the overall cost-benefit 
calculus regarding BRPs and DB plans is still positive. Dominant concerns appear to 
be human resource management factors, whereas changes in corporate governance 
seem to have had little impact. The new multi-layered benefit structures have allowed 
companies to reduce their cost and risk exposure by mixing DB and DC benefits. The 
comparatively large DB shares within these new benefit packages continue to 
function as a mechanism to retain core workers with firm-specific skills and to signal 
HPSOR\HUV¶ ORQJ-term commitment to prospective future employees. The brunt of 
FRPSDQLHV¶ FRVW FXWWLQJPHDVXUHVKDVEHHQERUQHE\ WKH LQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURIQRQ-
regular workers that are usually not eligible for any occupational pension benefits. 
 
Employees 
How did Japanese employees, represented by the labour unions, react towards pension 
restructuring? Although the labour unions did not involve themselves deeply in the 
discussions leading up to the 2001/2002 pension reforms (informants #1, #4), the 
resulting legal framework supports strongly their position since any transfers from the 
old DB to the new DC systems have to be agreed by a high proportion of the 
participants and the enterprise unions. Depending on the extent of such transfers 
between two-thirds and three-quarters of the participants as well as the labour unions 
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representing more than one third of the participants have to agree (NRKS and 
KNMKN, 2008). These stringent standards have certainly limited the possibilities of 
companies to conduct single-handedly far-reaching reforms. Furthermore, the 
Japanese Trade Union Federation, which consults individual enterprise unions, in 
principle takes a negative stance towards the introduction of DC plans (informants #1, 
#8, #9).  
However, in some sectors like electric machines, represented by the Japanese 
)HGHUDWLRQRI(OHFWULF0DFKLQH:RUNHUV¶8QLRQV WKHDUULYDORIDC pensions was in 
fact welcomed as a positive development because these plans allow employees to 
make their own investment decisions and are easily portable if employees switch jobs 
(informant #12). This assessment reflects the fact that -DSDQ¶V ODERXU PDUNHWV KDYH
recently witnessed an increase in mid-career hiring patterns. In the case of mid-career 
transfers, ZRUNHUV¶opportunity costs are lower in DC plans because their benefits are 
more easily portable to a new employer than DB benefits (informants #3, #12) . 
Overall, Japanese unions have not categorically blocked occupational pension reform 
at the company level. In many cases, they have cooperated with management and 
eventually agreed to the partial introduction of DC pensions (informants #2, #4, #7, 
#8, #9, #11, #12, #13, #14, #15, #17, #19). None of my informants could recall cases 
in which company unions had fundamentally opposed such reforms. Several 
informants stated that the labour unions had usually compromised on the pension 
LVVXHLQUHWXUQIRULQWKHXQLRQV¶YLHZPRUHLPSRUWDQWLVVXHVVXFKDVMREVHFXULW\RU
the maintenance of a corporate pension systems as such (informants #1, #7, #8, #9, 
#13, #14). 2YHUDOOWKHXQLRQV¶VWDQFHWRZDUGVrecent pension restructuring appears to 
be a reflection of the prevailing labour market duality in Japan which is characterized 
by little solidarity between regular and non-regular workers. Regular long-term 
workers, represented by the unions, have a particular interest in the long-term 
profitibility and survival of their companies and have therefore agreed to limited 
benefit reductions. Moreover, they have had an implicit interest in agreeing to the 
employment of more non-regular workers, who until recently could not even join 
labour unions, because these workers are normally not eligibile for occupational 
pensions. By employing more non-regular workers, the benefit cuts of regular 
workers could thus be kept to a minimum. 
 
Civil service 
Lets us finally examine how the interests of the public sector officialdom have 
influenced recent pension restructuring.  
Many political scientists have highlighted the strong agenda-setting and legislative 
power of the Japanese bureaucracy and its specific interests in securing post-
retirement career paths in semi-public agencies (e.g. Estévez-Abe, 2008; Johnson, 
1995). The occupational pension reforms of the years 2001/2002 confirm the 
important role of the bureaucracy in the policy making process, but also show that the 
reforms were not single-handedly initiated or shaped by the ministerial civil service.  
In the context of the financial deregulation initiative (the so-called µFinancial Big 
Bang¶ reforms) of the UXOLQJDGPLQLVWDWLRQXQGHUSULPHPLQLVWHU+DVKLPRWR5\ǌWDUR, 
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the business community, represented by the Japan Federation of Economic 
Organizations .HLGDQUHQ DQG WKH -DSDQ )HGHUDWLRQ RI (PSOR\HUV¶ $VVRFLDWLRQV
(Nikkeiren), as well as the Administrative Reform Council of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) had supported the introduction of DC pensions at least since 
the year 1996 (Keidanren, 1996; *\ǀVHL.DLNDNX.DLJL, 1996). Based on a June 1999 
report by WKH/'3¶V6XEFRPPLWHHRQ3ULYDWH3HQVLRQV four ministries, the Ministry 
of Labour (MOL), the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW), the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), got 
involved in drafting the pension legislation (Yamazaki, 2011).  
Running the joint secretariat of the four ministries in its Pension Bureau, MHW 
played a particularly important role. Prior to the 2001/2002 pension reforms, 
government regulation restricted tax benefits solely to pension plans that were 
designed as DB schemes. While MHW KDGRUJLQDOO\UHMHFWHGHPSOR\HUV¶requests for 
such tax breaks for occupational pensions, the eventual political compromise saw the 
introduction of EPFs in the year 1966. In retrospect, these arrangements turned out to 
be quite beneficial for this ministry. On the one hand, the resulting public-private 
pension mix corresponded well with the widely publized pension-mix model of the 
World Bank (1994) to which Japan also subscribed during the 1990s. In the related 
political discourse, MHW could cite comparatively generous occupational benefits as 
a reason not to extend public pension provision, or even to cut such provision. On the 
other hand, the semi-public nature of the occupational EPFs gave ministerial 
bureaucrats fairly close control over their design and management.  
In the late 1990s, MHW had mixed feelings about the planned pension changes. On 
the one hand, it acknowledged that companies had substantial difficulties financing 
their pension schemes and that they needed more flexible options, including DC 
plans. Improving the menu of occupational pension choices was also seen as an 
important way to enhance private pension provision in light of necessary public 
pension cuts. On the other hand, MHW considered and continues to consider EPFs 
and DB pensions as an integral component of a well-balanced public-private pension 
mix (informant #6). 
The MOF had similarily conflicting interests in the legislation. On the one hand, it 
considered - in line with MITI¶V YLHZ - DC plans as an important instrument to 
deregulate and GHYHORS-DSDQ¶VILQDQFLDOPDUNHWVDVSDUWRIWKH%LJ%DQJUHIRUPV; on 
the other hand, it feared and continues to fear that high tax-free contribution ceilings 
would result in declining tax revenues (Yamazaki, 2011; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 
2008b). In 1999, the tax issue led to a stalemate between the MHW, MOL, and MITI, 
which favoured more generous tax exemptions, and the MOF, which was opposed to 
them. The final decision on the tax exemption had thus to be taken E\WKH/'3¶VWD[
commission (Yamazaki, 2011). 
Despite differing ministerial interests in the particulars of the pension legislation, the 
overall cost-benefit calculus favoured inter-ministerial support for the new DC 
pensions, even though these developments would prove to have negative implications 
for the possible post-career paths of ministerial officials. In the past, retired 
bureaucrats from MHW and the Social Insurance Agency had numerous re-
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employment opportunities (as so-called µdescendants from heaven¶ or amakudari) 
related to the management of the semi-public EPFs in conjunction with the 
(PSOR\HHV¶ 3HQVLRQ )XQG $VVRFLDWLRQ (3)$.ǀVHL 1HQNLQ 5HQJǀNDL). With the 
dramatic decline of EPFs these job opportunities have dropped markedly and the 
EPFA had to be re-established as the Pension Fund Association (PFA) (.LJ\ǀ1HQNLQ
5HQJǀNDL) in October 2005. This new organization is under less ministerial control 
than its predecessor, but reportedly still has a strong self-interest to maintain the 
remaining EPFs and to organize the transfer of TQPPs into other DB-type plans, not 
least to secure employment opportunities for retired bureaucrats (informant #17). 
There can be no doubt that government regulation has played a large role in shaping 
FRPSDQLHV¶ options for pension restructuring. In fact, some foreign observers have 
claimed that the resilience of Japanese DB plans is the result of the low tax-free 
contribution ceilings of the DC schemes. According to Huh and McLellan (2007: 10), 
µthe low contribution caps set forth in the DC legislation prevented many Japanese 
firms from fully converting their existing DB plans to DC plans, so some firms turned 
instHDG WR &DVK %DODQFH &% SODQV¶ However, based on the available statistical 
evidence and the assessment of the informants, this statement cannot be said to reflect 
the overall complexity of the issue.  
The regulatory environment has undoubtedly exerted a considerable impact on the 
way companies have restructured their pension plans since 2001/2002 and explains to 
a certain extent the continued popularity of DB plans. However, many of the 
informants stated that these factors alone could not explain the resilience of DB plans.  
It is true that the DC law is rather inflexible and prevents an unlimited transfer to DC 
plans because it does not allow companies to pay voluntarily taxable contributions 
beyond the tax-free amounts. Since contributions are in most cases paid as a 
percentage of wages, which increase still very much in line with tenure, it is usually 
the contributions of older workers that can reach the maximum contribution ceilings. 
Accordingly, many companies have adopted overall contribution rates that allow their 
highest wage earners to stay within these ceilings (informants #3, #4, #7, #10, #19).  
In practice, however, only 29 per cent (2007) of DC plans have chosen amounts that 
reach the legal maximum contributions .LJ\ǀ 1HQNLQ 5HQJǀNDL, 2008). In other 
words, 70 per cent of companies seem not be directly affected by the tax framework. 
According to several informants, this underlines that the corporate commitment to DB 
benefits is real and not solely a function of the tax framework. According to this view, 
DB pensions are widely regarded as a tax-advantaged way to manage externally what 
used to be internally managed lump sum benefits (BRP). Higher tax ceilings for DC 
pensions would not address the fundamental problem that DC pensions are not a 
suitable vehicle to replace DB-type lump sum benefits (informants #2, #3, #6, #7, 
#12, #13, #15).  
However, other informants voiced the opinion that the contribution ceilings are posing 
a problem and that many larger companies would in fact like to transfer more DB into 
DC benefits (informants #10, #11, #16, #17, #19; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2008a). The 
business community has been requesting higher contribution ceilings for some years 
now and a slight increase is scheduled for 2010. Any major increases or the adoption 
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of a tax framework considering lifetime contributions, as occurs in the UK, seems 
unlikely (informants #4). 
To sum up, the civil service KDV DFFRPPRGDWHG HPSOR\HUV¶ GHPDQGV IRU QHZ '&
options and allowed companies to dissolve the dominant EPFs by returning the 
contracted-RXW SRUWLRQ RI WKH SXEOLF (PSOR\HHV¶ 3HQVLRQ ,QVXUDQFH EDFN WR WKH
government. The resulting decline of EPFs has significantly affected former 
arrangements where public pension benefits were complemented with privately-
financed but largely state-controlled occupational benefits. Consequently, the 
EXUHDXFUDF\¶V JULS RQ RFFXSDWLRQDO SHQVLRQ SURYLVLRQ KDV ZHDNHQHG FRQVLGHUDEO\. 
While low contribution caps on DC plans are congruent with some bureaucratic 
interests, it would be wrong to consider these caps as the only or dominant factor 
explaining the continued popularity of DB plans among Japanese companies. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has discussed the significant changes of Japanese occupational pensions 
since the early 2000s. Our analysis has shown that these schemes have been key 
components of policies to promote private welfare provision and have been highly 
compatible with human capital investment strategies that are based on long-term 
employment relationships of regular workers. However, since the 1990s, occupational 
pensions have come under increased pressure due to underfunding problems caused 
by depressed stock markets and changes in accounting standards that made these 
underfunding problems apparent. In response to these challenges Japanese companies 
restructured their occupational pension arrangements. The nature of these efforts can 
be explained with reference to existing institutional complementarities with the 
economic system on the one hand and chDQJHV LQ VRFLDO DFWRUV¶ FRVW-benefit 
calculations on the other hand. Whereas complementarities, especially with human 
resource management factors, have ultimately defined the limits of these changes, an 
actor-centered analysis has helped us to explain the particular nature of changes 
within these boundaries.  
Utilizing new legal options, Japanese companies have achieved cost and risk 
reductions through the partial replacement of DB benefits by CB and/or DC benefits 
and through an increase in the ratio of workers that are not covered by any retirement 
benefits. However, compared to recent developments in the US and UK, Japanese DB 
plans show a relatively strong resilience. After seven years since the introduction of 
DC plans, only 16 per cent of occupational pension participants are covered by these 
schemes. A variety of factors contribute to this finding. While explicit and strong 
employee pressure for the continued use of DB plans has been lacking, government 
regulation and entrenched views among employees and employers about the nature 
and purpose of retirement benefits have been shown to be crucial explanatory factors. 
The evolving multi-OD\HUHGVWUXFWXUHRIPDQ\FRPSDQLHV¶UHWLUHPHQWEHQHILWV\VWHPV
comprising both DB and DC benefits, can be explained as a result of regulatory 
FRQVWUDLQWVRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGDVDSXUSRVHIXODWWHPSWWROLPLWFRPSDQLHV¶ULVNVDQG
FRVWVZKLOHPDLQWDLQLQJDW OHDVWSDUWLDOO\ WKHHPSOR\HUV¶ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKHVRFLDO
welfare of their core workforce, on the other hand. While companies have sustained 
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pension benefits for these regular workers, they have at the same time increased the 
ratio of non-regular workers that are not eligible for these benefits.  
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Table 1: Indicators of Major Japanese Occupational Pension Plans (1998-2008) 
Name of Plan Nature of Plan Year Number of 
Plans  
Number of 
Members  
(in million) 
Amount of 
Assets  
(in trillion 
Yen) 
(PSOR\HHV¶3HQVLRQ)XQG
Plans (EPF) 
 
DB 1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
1,858 
1,832 
1,801 
1,737 
1,656 
1,357 
838 
687 
658 
626 
620 
12.00 
11.69 
11.39 
10.87 
10.38 
8.35 
6.15 
5.31 
5.25 
5.25 
4.80 
53.3 
62.2 
58.0 
57.0 
51.2 
48.6 
26.9 
24.7 
23.9 
20.6  
« 
Tax Qualified Pension Plans 
(TQPP) 
 
DB  1998 
 1999 
 2000 
 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 2007 
88,312 
85,047 
81,533 
78,148 
            73,582 
66,741 
59,162 
52,761 
45,090 
38,885 
10.29 
10.01 
9.68 
9.16 
8.58 
7.77 
6.54 
5.68 
5.06 
  4.43 
20.0 
21.2 
22.4 
22.6 
21.4 
20.7 
17.1 
17.2 
15.6 
 11.7 
Contract-Type DB Plan* DB 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
X 
15 
164 
478 
833 
1,335 
2,480 
X  
0.003 
1.35  
3.14 
3.84  
4.30 
5.06 
X 
« 
« 
8.1 
21.7 
33.0 
36.9 
Fund-Type DB Plan* DB 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
X 
0 
152 
514 
597 
605 
619 
X  
0.003 
1.35  
3.14 
3.84  
4.30 
5.06 
X 
« 
« 
8.1 
21.7 
33.0 
36.9 
Corporate DC Plan DC 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
70 
361 
845 
1,402 
1,866 
2,313 
2,710 
2,566 
0.088 
0.325 
0.708 
1.255 
1.733 
2.187 
2.711 
... 
« 
1.4 
5.6 
12.0 
22.8    
31.1 
36.5 
... 
1RWHV; QRWDSSOLFDEOH« QRWDYDLODEOH*Numbers for members and amount of 
assets do not distinguish between contract-type and fund-type plans. 
6RXUFHV/LIH'HVLJQ.HQN\ǌMR1RPXUD5HVHDUFK,QVWLWXWH.LJ\ǀ1HQNLQ
.HQN\ǌNDL.LJ\ǀ1HQNLQ5HQJǀNDL 
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Table 2: Occupational Pension Plans Offered in Addition to DC Plans (in %) 
 Less than 99 
employees 
100-299 
employees 
300-999 
employees 
Over 1000 
employees 
EPF 13.4 21.4 15.4 9.3 
TQPP 2.5 4.5 8.2 7.3 
DB-plan 8.2 15.4 25.1 47.0 
EPF/DB-plan 0.2 0.6 2.1 2.6 
EPF/TQPP 0.8 1.4 2.3 1.9 
TQPP/DB-plan 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 
Mutual Aid Ass. 
for School 
Teachers 
0.04 0.05 0.2 0.0 
NONE 74.7 56.3 46.3 31.0 
 
Number of 
corporations 
with DC-plans 
 
 
 
5,089 
 
 
 
2,024 
 
 
 
1,104 
 
 
 
645 
Source: .LJ\ǀ1HQNLQ.HQN\ǌNDL 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Occupational Pension Plan Participants (Relative and Absolute 
Numbers) 
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)LJXUH3DQDVRQLF¶V5HWLUHPHQW%HQHILW6\VWHPVLQFH 
-
 
Source: based on Fukuda 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 50 Age 60 
Tier 2 
Tier 1 
Tier 3 
Tier 1: Point system 
reflecting performance & 
position in work group grid   
 
Tier 2: Cash-balance plan 
linked to base pay 
 
Tier 3: Lump-sum for those 
retiring between 50-60 
Accumulation phase Retirement phase 
 
Cash-balance benefit with changing 
interest and no lifelong annuity option 
- DB benefit with fixed interest 
and lifelong annuity option 
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Appendix: List of informants 
 
 Position Affiliation 
#1 Executive chief researcher Research institute affiliated with a 
major labour union organization 
#2 Actuary  Federation of Workers and 
Consumers Insurance 
Cooperatives 
#3 Professor & pension expert National university 
#4 General manager, chief researcher & 
actuary 
Pension research institute of a 
major financial institution 
#5 Managing director & actuary Pension consultancy 
#6 High-ranking civil servant in pension 
department 
Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare 
#7 Senior research fellow & actuary Major think-tank 
#8 Section chief of welfare policy division Labour union organization 
#9 Executive director of welfare policy 
division 
³ 
#10 Head of group HR planning department ³ 
#11 Professor & HR expert Private university 
#12 Expert leader of global pension 
management & actuary 
Major automobile manufacturer 
#13 Manager in compensation and benefit 
group 
³ 
#14 Executive director of pension fund Major transport company 
#15 Executive director of pension fund Major electronics manufacturer 
#16 Chief advisor & pension expert Major think-tank 
#17 Chief researcher & pension expert Pension research institute 
#18 Representative director & president Medium-sized electronics 
manufacturer 
#19 Manager in general affairs/HR section ³ 
#20 Director of human resources planning 
group 
Major regional utility company 
#21 Vice-director of human resources 
planning group 
³ 
#22 Vice-director of human resources 
planning group 
³ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
